Much of the existing literature on the financial protection of health insurance focuses on the impact of insurance status on total out-of-pocket expenditure on all sorts of care sought, regardless of whether the insured patients use their health insurance cards. Using Vietnam's 2006 Household Living Standard Survey data and an appropriate multivariate regression model, this article assesses the influence of Vietnam's three health insurance schemes on out-of-pocket expenditures with and without controlling for the actual use of the health insurance card when seeking outpatient care. Vietnam's experience suggests that insurance provides some financial protection, provided that insurance benefits are actually accessed. Compared with private fee-paying patients, the use of the insurance card reduces out-of-pocket expenditures, on average, by as much as 50-56%. In contrast, failure to control for the use of the health insurance card reduces the financial protection of insurance to 26-37%. However, the financial protection benefits afforded by Vietnam's insurance schemes are distributed rather inequitably. Insurance reduces out-of-pocket expenditures by as much as 71-75% for contacts at the major state hospitals, as compared with 26-38% for contacts at the community health centres. The overall financial protection provided by insurance is also found to be larger for the higher-income individuals than the middle-and low-income individuals. Efforts to ensure that all enrollees receive equitable and good-quality health services according to the benefits package appear warranted. Improving the quality of care provided by the community health centres-the main access point for medical care for many enrollees with health insurance for the poor coverage-and a more effective referral system may also be a cost-effective way of channelling outpatient service contact to the lower-level health facilities, away from the overcrowded higher-level health facilities.
Introduction
In recent years, several low-income countries have established a national health insurance system as a way of ensuring access to affordable and effective healthcare services and of protecting households against the financial burden of illness. Yet, evidence from several low-and middle-income countries suggests that protective effects of insurance in terms of financial protection have been modest at best, especially for many illnesses that are of a less catastrophic nature and require ambulatory care (Yip and Berman 2001; Wang et al. 2005; Sepehri et al. 2006; Wagstaff and Yu 2006; Chankova et al. 2008; Nguyen et al. 2011) . The modest financial protection of insurance is often attributed, among other causes, to the wide use of non-designated health facilities and alternative sources of care that are not covered by the insurance scheme, the higher utilization of health services induced by insurance, limited coverage benefits, the cumbersome paperwork involved in accessing insurance benefits, the limited portability of the insurance scheme, the biassed treatment and poor attitude of service providers towards the insured patients, and high medical and non-medical expenses incurred by patients outside health facilities (Gertler and Solon 2000; Ensor and Cooper 2004; Sinha et al. 2006; Sparrow 2008; Sepehri et al. 2009; Wagstaff et al. 2009; Wagstaff 2010) . Insurance redistributes utilization across health facilities through its substitution effects, from the non-designated health facilities towards the designated ones. Reducing the monetary cost of access insurance may also induce higher utilization of health services. To the extent that insurance increases utilization and the intensity of care, the reduction in out-of-pocket spending becomes smaller than it would otherwise have been. However, the insured may forego the insurance benefits and pay full treatment fees if the assigned health facilities provide a higher quality of care to the private fee-paying patients than it is normally available to the insured patients (Nguyen 2005; World Bank 2007) . Similarly, rather than incurring the high indirect transaction costs involved in accessing benefits at the assigned health facilities the insured may choose the nearby non-assigned health facilities and pay the full treatment fees.
These potential barriers to accessing health insurance benefits suggest that the potential financial risk protection of insurance is more likely to vary by the extent to which the insured patients use their insurance cards when seeking care. While there has been a small but growing literature on the impact of health insurance on out-of-pocket expenditures in the low-and middle-income countries (Yip and Berman 2001; Wang et al. 2005; Sepehri et al. 2006; Wagstaff and Yu 2006; Nguyen et al. 2011) , these studies often assess the influence of insurance on the total out-of-pocket expenditures on care sought from various providers, regardless of whether the insured patients use their insurance cards. Failure to control for the use of health insurance cards when seeking care may thus lead to unreliable results for policy. The primary aim of this article is to fill this gap and assess the financial protection of Vietnam's three insurance schemes, while controlling for the use of the insurance card when seeking outpatient care. Specifically, using Vietnam's Household Living Standards Survey (VHLSS) 2006 and an appropriate multivariate regression model, this article aims to answer two questions. First, how much do Vietnam's three insurance schemes reduce out-of-pocket expenditures, on average, with and without controlling for the use of health insurance cards? Second, does the degree of financial protection afforded by the insurance schemes vary across income quintiles and health facilities where insurance benefits could be accessed? VHLSS 2006 provides detailed information, not only on utilization of outpatient care and out-of-pocket expenditures at the facility level but, but also on whether the insured patients use their insurance cards when seeking care. Vietnam's recent experience with health insurance suggests that 44% of the insured do not use their insurance cards when seeking outpatient care and almost one in five of the insured enrollees uses private health facilities and pays the full treatment fees (Sepehri et al. 2009 ).
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. The next section provides a brief review of Vietnam's health insurance schemes, followed by a description of the data and methods. The article then presents and discusses the results.
An overview of Vietnam's health insurance schemes
To improve access to healthcare services and protect the population against the financial burden of illness, the government introduced a formal social insurance scheme in 1992. The scheme was initially compulsory for formal sector employees, retirees, the disabled and veterans and their dependants, but was later extended to include a voluntary scheme and an insurance scheme for the poor. The voluntary health insurance (VHI) scheme is, in principle, open to all those not eligible for coverage under the compulsory health insurance (CHI) scheme, including self-employed, informal sector employees, students and school children and dependants of CHI members [for a detailed account of these insurance schemes, see Lieberman and Wagstaff (2009) and Ministry of Health and Health Partnership (2008) ]. Rather than being strictly a volunteer scheme, VHI is mostly a semi-compulsory scheme as, schools are under pressure to enroll students. Despite a recent rapid increase in the VHI coverage among farmers, self-employed and dependants of the CHI enrollees, the scheme continues to be dominated by school pupils and university students.
The health insurance scheme for the poor (HIP) covers the poor, residents of communities with very difficult socio-economic circumstances and ethnic minorities living in selected mountainous provinces designated as difficult. The scheme is financed jointly by the central government (75%) and provinces and charitable organization (25%).
Initially, provinces were free to decide whether to use the fund to purchase health insurance or to manage the risk themselves and provide direct reimbursement to providers. The latter option was phased out in 2005, requiring all provinces to enroll the beneficiaries in the government's social health insurance programme. In contrast to the CHI and VHI schemes, the HIP scheme, in principle, covers all family members of the eligible households. By 2006, the HIP scheme covered around 60% of the eligible population and the HIP scheme was the single largest scheme, accounting for 43% of all enrollees, followed by the CHI scheme (28%) (Vietnam Social Security 2006; Wagstaff 2010) . There is also a programme of free healthcare for children under 6 years of age, initiated in early 1991. In 2006, about 32% of under-six children were enrolled in the free healthcare for under-six children and nearly half were enrolled in the voluntary and compulsory (policy beneficiaries) programmes, leaving almost 1 million under-six children (nearly 20%) with no coverage (Lieberman and Wagstaff 2009 ).
These insurance schemes are administered by Vietnam Social Security (VSS), a government agency that also manages pension and other social security funds, all under one umbrella. Insurance benefits can mainly be accessed at the public health facilities, where providers are reimbursed on a fee-for-services basis. Although VSS has begun contracting with private providers, they still represent a small proportion of care provided under the national insurance programme. In 2006, <1% of all enrollees were registered at the private health facilities (General Statistical Office 2008) . The insured members are normally assigned to the nearest public health facility and, although the enrollees could change the assigned health facility, the process is cumbersome. According to the VHLSS 2006, 76 and 73% of the CHI and VHI enrollees were registered at district and higher-level public hospitals, respectively, as compared with one-third of the HIP enrollees (General Statistical Office 2008) . The latter were mostly registered at the community health centres (63%) and district hospitals (33%). Although the benefits are, in principle, portable, provided that the insured obtain a letter of referral from the assigned health facility, in practice, the referral system is working poorly (Ministry of Health and UNICEF 2007) . The quality of care varies between the public health facilities and sometimes even within the same facility. The recent healthcare reform initiatives have granted greater financial autonomy to the public health facilities, allowing the public hospitals to establish wards for private fee-paying patients and provide them with better quality care-including on-demand services such as choice of doctor, shorter waiting time and choice of scanning technology-than is normally available in regular hospital areas (World Bank 2007; Ministry of Health and Health Partnership Group 2008) . In contrast, the quality of care provided by community health centres, which are the main access points for medical care for many poor enrollees covered under the HIP scheme, is generally perceived to be low (Tuan et al. 2005; World Bank 2007) . There is also some evidence indicating that the HIP beneficiaries often receive less attention than patients paying on a private basis, particularly from the level of district hospitals upwards (World Bank 2007) .
All three insurance schemes, in principle, provide the same benefits package, covering both outpatient and inpatient contacts and drugs listed as reimbursable by the Ministry of Health. However, in practice, the link between benefits and contributions remains strong and there is little risk-sharing across these insurance schemes as these schemes are managed separately by VSS. To finance outpatient care for its members, VSS provides quarterly advances to each health facility of 45% of the available 'healthcare fund' [total annual insurance premiums collected from the insurance enrollees registered at the facility, adjusted for the amount set aside for administrative costs (8.5%) and a reserve fund (5%)]. This provider reimbursement system implies that the health facilities that attract relatively highly-paid enrollees, especially high-income CHI enrollees, receive higher average outpatient care reimbursements than those that attract less-well-paid members and HIP beneficiaries (Knowles et al. 2005) . In 2006, the average premium contribution per CHI enrollee was almost 5.4 times as large as the average premium contribution per VHI enrollee (Vietnam Social Security 2006) . In 2006, HIP beneficiaries accounted for 41% of the total insured population, while the corresponding total premiums collected by VSS and reimbursements to health facilities accounted for only 17 and 15%, respectively (Ministry of Health and Health Partnership Group 2008) .
Inequities in the quality of care received by enrollees under various insurance schemes are further compounded by Vietnam's evolving fee-for-service structure, which is also used as a basis for social health insurance reimbursement. A 1995 policy document provided a more detailed fee structure, setting out the range of fees each type of hospital and clinic could charge for each type of consultation and each type of diagnostic test and procedure. Fees were also set higher at higher-level health facilities.
Although fees have changed little since 1995, fees for newer, high-tech services introduced after 1995 are charged at the prevailing market prices. Insofar as many procedures covered by the 1995 price schedule are relatively low-tech, and hospitals are able to charge higher fees for newer, high-tech services, the evolving fee structure has created an incentive for providers to focus more on case types requiring tests and other interventions that are priced favourably, at the expense of basic patient services such as simple diagnostic services (Lieberman and Wagstaff 2009 ). As reimbursements for outpatient care, provided to enrollees under various insurance schemes, are capped by the available healthcare fund allocated to each health facility, Vietnam's evolving fee structure has also created an incentive for providers to tailor the quality of care according to each scheme's budget cap (Tran et al. 2011) . This provider payment system has left health insurance funds open to all sorts of abuses by providers. For example, while the inspection unit of VSS is in theory responsible for assessing whether the charges reported to VSS are plausible, in practice this is a purely administrative check, resulting in a collective invoice being submitted by the providers (Ministry of Health and Health Partnership Group 2008) .
Even though health insurance coverage rates continue to increase, depth of insurance coverage remains low, reflecting the wide use of non-designated health facilities and alternative sources of care that are not covered by the insurance scheme, limited coverage benefits, a poorly working referral system and high medical and non-medical expenses incurred by patients outside health facilities (Lieberman and Wagstaff 2009) . A co-insurance rate of 20% for those enrollees with CHI and VHI coverage was introduced in 2002. The 20% coinsurance rate was, however, scrapped in 2005 and then reintroduced later: in 2010, the coinsurance rate varied from 20% for those with CHI and VHI coverage to 5% for those with HIP coverage. The proportion of total health spending sourced from health insurance was only 17.6% in 2008, even though almost 58% were covered by insurance (Ministry of Health and Health Partnership Group 2008) . Out-of-pocket expenditures accounted for as much as 52% of total health spending.
Data and methods

Data
The data in this study are from VHLSS 2006 (General Statistical Office 2008). The VHLSS is a large, nationally representative sample of about 46 000 providing complete income/expenditure information for 9189 households. The health section of the survey collected detailed information on the utilization of outpatient care and out-of-pocket expenditures at the facility level, the type of health insurance and the number of times insurance enrollees used their health insurance cards when seeking outpatient/inpatient care.
The survey uses a 4-week and 12-month recall period to collect information on outpatient contacts. Four-week outpatient data are generally preferable to the 12-month data, due to their shorter recall period. However, information on the use of health insurance cards is only available for 12-month outpatient contacts; hence, our choice of the 12-month utilization data. We also focus on outpatient care, as the failure to access insurance benefits is more pronounced in the case of outpatient care than inpatient care. The latter is mainly provided by the state-owned hospitals and almost 81% of the insured used their cards when utilizing inpatient care (General Statistical Office 2008) . Finally, due to the ambiguity of free health insurance for children under 6 years of age regarding its implementation, we have chosen to limit the sample to 6 years and older. Once we merge individual and household records of the sample population with outpatient contacts, our sample consists of 10 907 individuals and 13 439 outpatient contacts at the facility level.
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Methods
Consistent with the previous literature, out-of-pocket health expenditure is expected to be influenced by a range of factors, including the number of outpatient contacts, types of health insurance and health facility contacted, severity of illness, age, gender, education, marital status, income, ethnicity, geographical location and distance to the nearest hospital. In the absence of data on the quality of care provided by Vietnam's various types of providers, the inclusion of types of health facility in the model acts as a proxy, allowing us to control for the observed wide variation in the quality of care across various providers. As insurance affects out-of-pocket spending-directly by reducing the cost of access and indirectly by increasing the volume of care-the inclusion of the number of outpatient contacts at a health facility allows us to tease out the direct effect of insurance on the annual out-of-pocket expenditures at the facility level.
With 17% of the sample (1932) reporting zero out-of-pocket expenditures at a health facility, a two-part model is used to obtain unbiased impacts of the influence of the variables that influence the magnitude of out-of-pocket expenditures.
2 The first part of the model estimates the likelihood of positive out-of-pocket payments at a health facility, whereas the second part of the model estimates the positive level of out-of-pocket expenditure per patient per facility. The natural logarithm of non-zero health expenditure is used to reduce the effects of the skewed nature of the health expenditure data. The sample size in the second part of the model contained 11 137 observations for 8968 individual patients, of whom 82% contacted only one type of health facility. Finally, as the VHLSS data uses a three-stage, stratified cluster sampling methodology: the clustering of responses by the primary sampling unit (community) raises the possibility of intra-community correlation. Standard errors of the estimated coefficients are thus corrected for intra-community correlation (heteroscedasticity). We also apply appropriate sampling weights to produce unbiased population estimates. Stata version 11 was used for all data analysis.
Study variables
It is found that out-of-pocket health expenditures are influenced by a wide range of individual-, household-and community-specific variables. The individual-specific variables include insurance status, number of outpatient contacts, types of health facility contacted, severity of illness, age, marital status and education. The household-specific variables include household income and ethnicity. The community level variable includes geographical location and distance to the nearest health facility.
The dependent variable is the natural log of expenditure on outpatient treatment at a health facility, including consultation, diagnosis, medication, travel and accommodation expenses for 12 months. Health insurance is represented by three insurance dummies, representing Vietnam's three insurance schemes, CHI, VHI and HIP. Types of health facilities are represented by five health facility dummies, community health centres (reference category), district hospitals, the higher-level state hospitals, private clinics/hospitals and traditional practitioners. The severity of illness is proxied by the number of bedridden days and it is measured by four dummies, representing those who reported no activity limitation (reference category), bedridden for 1 week, 2 weeks and 3 weeks and longer. Marital status is represented by a dummy variable that equals one if the individual is currently married and the level of education of the respondent is represented by five dummies: no education (reference group), primary, lower secondary, upper secondary and university education. The education variable for children aged 15 and younger refers to education of the head of HOW MUCH DO I SAVE IF I USE MY INSURANCE CARD?
household. Household economic status is measured by the per capita consumption expenditure quintile, referred to as the income quintile throughout this article. Ethnicity is represented by a dummy variable that equals one if an individual is a member of the ethnic majority 'kin' or Chinese. Geographical location is measured by rural-urban and regional dummies. Distance to the nearest polyclinic/district hospital from the community/ward is measured by a continuous variable. Other potential community level variables, such as the density of health facilities and providers, were excluded from the analysis due to incompleteness or the poor quality of data. 
Results
Descriptive analysis
Figure 1 displays distribution of outpatient contacts across providers by insurance status. As expected, insurance shifts utilization from private to public providers, where insurance benefits could be accessed. However, private providers remain a significant source of outpatient care for all insurance enrollees, accounting for one-fourth of all outpatient contacts by the insurance enrollees, and as much as 32% of those with VHI coverage. The upper panel of Table 2 displays the proportion of the insured who did not use their cards when seeking outpatient care. The likelihood of not accessing health insurance benefits tends to vary across Vietnam's three insurance schemes and providers. The proportion of the insurance enrollees that did not use their cards when seeking care at both private and public health facilities ranges from as high as 55% for the VHI enrollees, to as low as 35% for the HIP enrollees. The insured are also more likely not to access their insurance benefits when seeking care at the higher-level state hospitals (34%) than at the community health centres (24.1%). Moreover, almost 45% of the patients with VHI coverage did not use their cards when seeking outpatient care at the higher-level state hospitals, as compared with 26% for those with CHI coverage. The likelihood of accessing insurance benefits also varies with whether the insured patient uses the assigned/referred health facility or other health facilities. Although not shown here, 85% of the insured patients who visited their assigned public health facilities used their cards, as compared with 62 and 57% of those visiting the higher-or lower-level public health facilities than their assigned public health facility, respectively. Moreover, of those insured who did not use their health insurance cards when seeking outpatient care at public health facilities, almost one-fifth of the individuals in the top two income quintiles reported low quality of care as the main reason for not using their card, as compared with 10% for those in the bottom two income quintiles. The lower panel of Table 2 reports the average out-of-pocket expenditures per outpatient contact. The average out-of-pocket expenditures per outpatient contact by the private fee-paying patients varies greatly across providers, with an outpatient contact at the higher-level public hospitals costing over 10 times as much as contact at the community health centres-516 000 VND vs 51 000 VND. However, these facility-level average out-of-pocket expenditures per outpatient visit mask wide variations in out-of-pocket expenditures by the poor and well-to-do patients within each type of health facility. The variation is particularly pronounced at the higher-level state hospitals, where the rich pay more than twice the amount paid by the poor (680 000 VND vs 328 000 VND) for each outpatient contact. As Table 2 indicates, health insurance tends to reduce the out-of-pocket expenditure less for those using the community health centres (61%) than for those using district hospitals (75%) and the higher-level public hospitals (70%).
Econometric results
The econometric results for non-zero out-of-pocket expenditures at a health facility are reported in Table 3 . The model is estimated with and without controlling for the use of the insurance card. Since the focus of the study is on the impact of insurance and other covariates on the magnitude of out-ofpocket payments, Table 3 presents the results for the second part of the two-part model, excluding those outpatient contacts with zero out-of-pocket payment.
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Model 1 in Table 3 was estimated using the individual health insurance status (insured vs uninsured), regardless of whether the insured patients used their cards. The results are summarized in the first two columns of Results of other variables are consistent with this expectation, with patients using district and higher-level public hospitals spending, on average, far more than those using the community health centres (reference category). Similarly, those with more bedridden days of illness spend, on average, more than those with no limited activity (reference category). The estimated coefficients for age and age-squared suggest that out-of-pocket expenditures tend to increase with age, but at a declining rate. Gender, marital status and education have no significant influence on out-of-pocket expenditures. The estimated coefficients for income quintiles indicate a strong income gradient, with patients in the richest two income quintiles spending, on average, 30 and 57% more, respectively, than those in the poorest income quintile (reference category). Members of the ethnic majority 'kin' or Chinese also spend, on overage, about 15% more than those from the ethnic minority groups (reference category). As expected, out-of-pocket expenditures increase with the distance to the nearest polyclinic/district hospital.
In Model 2, insurance dummies are redefined to take into account the information on the use of the health insurance card by the insured patients. Comparing these results with those of Model 1 indicates that the financial protection of insurance is, as expected, greater once we control for the actual use of the insurance card. The negative effect of CHI on out-of-pocket expenditures increases from 37 to 63% and from 26 to 54% for those with VHI coverage. The effect is slightly smaller for those with HIP coverage (34 vs 52%).
To assess the differential influence of health insurance on out-of-pocket expenditures across types of health facilities and income quintiles, Model 2 (using the health insurance card) is extended by including two sets of interaction terms, one between insurance and each type of health facility and one between insurance and each income quintile. The results for the interaction terms are reported in Table 4 : detailed results are available from the author upon request.
Model 3 in Table 4 incorporates interaction terms between insurance and the public health facilities where insurance benefits could be accessed-community health centres, district and higher-level government hospitals. The estimated coefficients for the nine interaction terms suggest that insurance reduces out-of-pocket expenditures more for contacts at the higher-level state hospitals than at the community heath centres. Both CHI and VHI reduce out-of-pocket expenditures by as much as 70-72% for contacts at the higher-level state hospitals. In contrast, the financial protection of insurance is far smaller for contacts at the community health centres, where the three insurance schemes reduce out-of-pocket expenditures by 26-38%. The estimated coefficient for the interaction terms between higher-level hospitals and HIP should be interpreted with care, considering the small number of observations. The results from the interaction between income quintiles and insurance schemes are summarized under Model 4 of Table 4 . Testing for equality among the interaction terms suggested that the some income quintiles could be aggregated. CHI reduces out-of-pocket expenditures by as much as 71% for those in the richest two income quintiles and by 50% for those in the middle-and lower-income quintiles. Similarly, VHI reduces out-of-pocket expenditures by as much as 70% for those in the richest income quintile and by 42% for those in the middle and lower income quintiles.
Discussion and conclusions
Using VHLS 2006, this article empirically assesses the financial protection provided by Vietnam's three insurance schemes, while controlling for the use of insurance cards when seeking outpatient care and for a wide range of individual-and household-level factors. The article also examines the extent to which the financial protection granted by the insurance schemes varies across both income quintiles and various public heathcare facilities. The estimated coefficient of the insurance status variable, regardless of whether the insured used their cards when seeking care, suggests that insurance reduces out-of-pocket spending by 37 and 34%, respectively, for those with the CHI and HIP coverage and by 26% for those with the VHI coverage. The financial protection of insurance was found to be far greater once we controlled for the use of the health insurance card. Insurance reduces out-of-pocket expenditures by as much as 63% for those with CHI coverage and by 52-54% for those with HIP and VHI coverage. The difference between the two sets of estimates is larger for the VHI enrollees, 26 vs 54%, which reflects partly the fact that VHI enrollees are less likely to use their insurance card than other insurance enrollees. A relatively low premium makes the VHI enrollees less attractive to providers and, rather than risking longer waiting times and lower quality of care, these enrollees may forego insurance benefits and incur the full treatment fees (Nguyen 2005) . Many parents are found to express a desire that Other regressors for each model correspond to those listed in Table 3 .
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their children be treated by doctors at higher-level public facilities (Ministry of Health and UNICEF 2007) . Additional analysis of the interaction terms-involving the type of insurance scheme and health facility, as well as type of insurance and income quintiles-suggests that the overall financial protection provided by Vietnam's three insurance schemes masks wide variations in the reduction in out-ofpocket expenditures across income quintiles and various public providers, where insurance benefits are accessed. The reduction in out-of-pocket expenditures is greater for contacts involving district and the higher-level state hospitals than the community health centres. Insurance reduces out-of-pocket expenditures by as much as 68-72% for contacts at the major state hospitals as compared with 26-38% for contacts at the community health centres. Similarly, CHI and VHI reduce out-of-pocket expenditures more for the rich than the middle-and lower-income enrollees.
The finding that the financial protection of insurance is greater for CHI enrollees than other insurance schemes' enrollees may partly reflect their disproportionate higher usage of district and higher-level state hospitals than other insurance scheme enrollees. Moreover, higher treatment fees charged by the higher-level health facilities and greater ability of the higher-level state hospitals to tailor the quality and quantity of care according to the ability of the private fee-paying patients may also explain why the financial protection of insurance is greater at the higher-level health facilities than the lower-level health facilities, and greater for the higherincome enrollees than it is for lower-income enrollees. The evolving fee structure has created an incentive for providers, especially public hospitals, to focus more on case types requiring tests and other interventions that are priced favourably, and recover a larger fraction of the costs of care through payments by the better-off patients or VSS (Lieberman and Wagstaff 2009 ). Limited drug coverage, especially imported drugs, lack of a central procurement agency for drugs and frequent shortages of drugs at the public health facilities also means higher out-of-pocket expenditures by the insured, especially for contacts at the community health centres, where out-of-pocket payments for drugs alone account for as much as 61% of the insured out-of-pocket expenditures (Ministry of Health and General Statistical Office 2002; Tran et al. 2011) . The drug coverage is further limited by the community health centres' practice of running their own private pharmacy within the health facility establishment, a practice that is not officially sanctioned (Sepehri et al. 2003) .
The results in Tables and 3 and 4 assume that insurance is exogenous, but our estimates of the insurance effect may be subject to endogeneity bias if there is adverse selection in Vietnam's health insurance schemes. CHI (and perhaps HIP as well) is unlikely to be affected by selection because of categorical eligibility. While self-selection into VHI is plausible, especially among the self-employed and dependants of the CHI enrollees, it is less likely to be serious, given the predominance of school pupils and university students among the voluntary insurance enrollees. Moreover, controlling for the number of outpatient contacts is likely to reduce the potential selection bias, at least to the extent to which self-selection into the VHI is reflected in higher utilization rates of outpatient care. Self-selection into the VHI may also be reflected in a higher intensity of care. However, the administrative data suggest no difference in the average reimbursement per outpatient contact between the farmers, self-employed and dependants of the CHI enrollees with VHI coverage and those with the CHI coverage (Vietnam Social Security 2006) . Our estimates may also be subject to endogeneity bias if the number of outpatient visits and choice of provider are endogenous to the process of utilization of outpatient care. Ideally, controlling for the endogeneity of the number of outpatient visits requires valid instruments. Since both out-of-pocket health expenditures and the number of visits are generally influenced by almost the same set of variables, it is rather hard to come up with valid instruments. However, given the rather modest influence of insurance on the number of outpatient contacts and the robustness of our results to the inclusion of the number of visits, any potential bias is likely to be rather small. 7 Finally, the estimated coefficients of insurance variables may underestimate the protective effect of insurance, as the model excludes observations with zero out-of-pocket spending, most of which involved those with health insurance coverage.
Our results on the influence of socio-economic variables are generally in line with those reported elsewhere. The positive influence of age on out-of-pocket spending may reflect the type and severity of illness. Children and younger adults tend to suffer more from communicable diseases, which are cheaper to treat, compared with older adults who tend to experience a greater proportion of chronic illnesses and other disabilities, which are more expensive to treat. The influence of education on out-of-pocket spending is found to be mixed (Trivedi 2002; Hjortsberg 2003; Chankova et al. 2008) . The finding that patients from the poor households spend far less than those from the non-poor households is consistent with findings from other low-income countries (Su et al. 2006; Chankova et al. 2008) .
These findings have important policy implications for healthcare financing and delivery in Vietnam and other lowincome countries. First, the finding that Vietnam's three insurance schemes do provide some financial protection to those who actually use their cards and that the financial protection of insurance is greater at the district-and higher-level state hospitals than at the community health centres is an important and positive one. To the extent that the higher-level health facilities are used for the treatment of severe and complex conditions that require costly treatments, the financial protection afforded by insurance is of critical importance. However, higher treatment fees charged by the higher-level health facilities may still leave insured patients, especially the poor and near poor, with a heavy financial burden. Second, the finding that HIP reduces out-of-pocket payments on outpatient care sought at the community health centres-the main access point for medical for the HIP enrollees-by 30% suggests that the financial benefits afforded by Vietnam's insurance schemes are distributed rather inequitably. Unless efforts are made to ensure that all enrollees receive equitable and good-quality health services according to the benefits package, the government's goal of achieving universal insurance by 2015 may not be realistic. Improving the quality of care provided by the community health and a more effective referral system may also be a cost-effective way of channelling outpatient service contacts to the lower-level health facilities, away from the over-crowded higher-level health facilities. Some caveats are in order. The data on the use of outpatient care are subject to recall errors. The regression model does not control adequately for differences in the quality of care provided to the insured-and private fee-paying patients. Although controlling for the type of provider may act as a proxy for the quality of care across various providers, variations in style of care within the same facility might introduce some bias into our results. More specifically, the results may overestimate the financial protection of insurance, at least to the extent to which health facilities, especially the higher-level facilities, provide a higher quality of care to the private fee-paying patients than is normally available to the insured patients. Nor does the regression model properly control for patient mix, although inclusion of the number of outpatient visits, types of health facilities and patient activity limitations may act as proxies for pay for severity of an illness. Finally, the estimated coefficients of health insurance may be subject to selectivity bias, if the insured's decision to use their health insurance cards is correlated to unobservable individual-level factors, such as type and severity of illness, which determine health expenditures.
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Endnotes
1 There were 279 insurance enrollees who had more than one outpatient contact in the past 12 months and reported using their cards only for some of those contacts. In the absence of information on the use of insurance card for each outpatient contact, we have chosen to drop these observations-these observations (376 visits) account only for 5% of all outpatient contacts by the insured. 2 About 81% of those who reported zero out-of-pocket expenditures were insured and used their cards, 40% were covered by the HIP, 33% by the CHI scheme and 27% by the VHI scheme. Contacts at the community health centres accounted for almost half of all outpatient contacts by individuals reported zero out-of-pocket expenditure. 3 Patients who contacted two and three types of health facility accounted for 15.1 and 2.4%, respectively. Less than 0.4% of the patients contacted four types of health facility. 4 Given the small number of outpatient contacts at regional general polyclinics, we have chosen to include regional general polyclinics under district hospitals. 5 The estimated coefficients of the insurance dummies from the first part of the two-part model suggest that insurance reduces the odds of having positive out-of-pocket expenditures by 90% for those with CHI and VHI coverage and by 87% for those with HIP coverage. 6 In the semilogarithmic regression equation of Table 3 , the percentage effect of insurance on out-of-pocket expenditure is given by (e b À 1) Â 100. 7 We also estimated separately a regression model for the number of outpatient visits using the same explanatory variables as used for the out-of-pocket expenditures model. Results suggest that the positive influence of insurance on the number of outpatient contacts is rather modest, and the influence of VHI is not statistically different from the influence of CHI and HIP. Results are available from the author upon request. 8 We re-estimated Model 2 using two separate insurance dummies for those who used their card and those who did not. The estimated coefficients of the insurance dummies for those who did not use their card were all negative and statistically significant only for VHI and HIP enrollees. The results indicate that VHI and HIP enrollees who did not use their card spent on average about 6 and 15%, respectively, less than the amount by the uninsured patients.
